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October 11, 2016 at 02:00 AM
As a compliance consultant with a specialty in the DOL fiduciary rule, I have received the following question a countless number of times: Are agent incentive trips really gone in a post-DOL fiduciary rule world?
My answers? Yes. And maybe.
As you might expect, this analysis requires a bit of background and some deep diving into DOL’s preambles that precede the rule. This article will attempt to explain the Yes and the Maybe answers above, and also forecast the future of agent incentive trips in the annuity industry.
Background
In October 2015, Senator Elizabeth Warren’s office released a report on agent sales incentives in the annuity industry titled “Villas, Castles and Vacations: How Perks and Giveaways Create Conflicts of Interest in the Annuity Industry.” The report argued that trips and non-cash incentives create conflicts of interest for sellers of annuity products and that additional regulation was necessary to curb these conflicts.
Enter: The Department of Labor fiduciary rule.
At the time, most industry insiders saw that Sen. Warren’s report was strategically released as a backdrop to the fiduciary rule, as the DOL began gearing up for an anticipated challenge with certain industry parties who did not agree with the rule’s execution of its aims.
Related: DOL 101: The fiduciary rule’s impact on annuity carriers
Regardless of which political or philosophical perspective you may have when it comes to defining a conflict of interest, one thing is clear: The fiduciary rule clearly discourages carriers and independent marketing organizations (IMOs) from continuing to offer the production-based incentives detailed in Sen. Warren’s report.
The annuity product line of demarcation
The fiduciary rule provides that producers selling annuity products that are purchased with qualified money are now “fiduciaries,” with new duties of prudence and loyalty taking over where a “suitability” standard once stood. The DOL provides that a fiduciary’s receipt of variable commissions is considered a “prohibited transaction” but that annuity sellers can seek relief from a “prohibited transaction exemption” (or PTE) to continue receiving customary compensation, so long as the compensation is “reasonable.”
The DOL drew a line of demarcation for fixed annuity products for the purpose of the PTEs. First, it reissued an amended PTE 84-24 (or “new” PTE 84-24) for “fixed rate annuity contracts,” and second, it issued a new PTE — the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE) for fixed indexed and variable annuities. (Note that the fiduciary rule also broadly applies to all other financial products sold with qualified money — the scope of which this article does not address). Hence, it is critical to recognize the difference between the two PTEs when analyzing whether agent incentives, trips and other non-cash compensation may be earned by annuity advisors under the rule.
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Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 84-24 was drafted with “simple commission payments in mind.” (Photo: iStock)
Incentives under PTE 84-24
PTE 84-24 has been in existence since 1977, but the DOL provided significant revisions to the exemption under the new rule. In the preamble to PTE 84-24, the DOL notes that the exemption was originally crafted with “simple commission payments in mind,” and that many of the new compensation structures created since that time no longer fit within the scope of the exemption.
Under the new rule, the DOL determined that it was important to specify exactly what types of commissions are permissible in order to seek relief from each prohibited transaction exemption. To that end, the DOL provided an explicit definition of “Insurance Commission” in the new PTE 84-24. Section VI(f) of PTE 84-24 provides:
(f) The term “Insurance Commission” mean a sales commission paid by the insurance company to the insurance agent or broker or pension consultant for the service of effecting the purchase of a Fixed Rate Annuity Contract or insurance contract, including renewal fees and trailers, but not revenue sharing payments, administrative fees, or marketing payments.
It is important to note how limited this definition seems to be written. Also note that the definition is silent on bonuses, trips or other incentives.
Next, in the preamble to PTE 84-24, the DOL provides that the exemption “does not extend relief … to revenue sharing or other payments not within the definition of Insurance Commission.” As a result, it appears the DOL is firing a warning shot to annuity sellers that receipt of forms of compensation or benefits outside the scope of this limited “Insurance Commission” definition may be beyond the scope of PTE 84-24.
Related: DOL 101: The fiduciary rule’s impact on insurance-only agents
Some had commented to the DOL’s proposed rule that the limited “Insurance Commission” definition in proposed PTE 84-24 would create uncertainty in the industry as to what constitutes a permissible commission under the exemption. However, in the final PTE 84-24 the DOL noted that it was not persuaded by these requests to expand the definition of Insurance Commission but did note the following:
“The Department specifically provided relief for such payments in the Best Interest Contract Exemption. That exemption addresses the payment structures that have developed since PTE 84-24 was originally adopted. The Department intends that relief for such payments be provided through the Best Interest Contract Exemption on the grounds that the exemption was drafted to specifically address the unique conflicts of interest that are created by these types of payments.”
As a result, it appears that any payments outside the scope of the Insurance Commission definition would require the fiduciary to seek relief under the BICE, not PTE 84-24. As the DOL puts it: “For parties who are interested in broader relief in this area, the Best Interest Contract Exemption is available.”
In short, incentive trips are going to be a problem for annuity sellers wanting to rely on PTE 84-24. This is the explanation for the “Yes” answer to the question posed at the beginning of the article.
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BICE was created to hold more financial institutions accountable for customer conflicts of interest. (Photo: iStock)
What about the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE)?
As we saw in the PTE 84-24 preamble, the DOL created a new PTE — the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE) to account for all the new commission payment structures that have developed in the time since PTE 84-24 was released. The DOL also created the BICE to try to hold financial institutions more accountable for any conflicts of interest involved in the sale with the new requirement of a “Best Interest Contract” that must be signed by the customer and the advisor’s supervising financial institution. Without such a consumer contract and an approved supervising “financial institution,” the advisor can’t earn any commissions.
What does this mean for the future of incentives?
