Thursday’s Pimco cross-selling story is a fascinating little study in bond market liquidity. There are two stories of bond market liquidity. One is a story of costs: As dealers retreat from trading risk, it becomes harder to move bonds between end users. Fund X wants to sell a particular sort of bond right now. Two days later, Fund Y wants to buy a slightly different sort of bond — maybe a bond from the same company but with a different maturity, or from a different company in the same industry.
In the glory days of liquidity, Fund X would sell its bond to a dealer bank, and two days later Fund Y would buy its preferred bond from the dealer’s vast inventory of bonds. The dealer overall would be flattish on the trade: It would increase its bond exposure by buying from Fund X, and reduce it by selling to Fund Y, and take a small amount of risk on the two days’ delay and the mismatch between the different bonds that it was trading. The dealer made its money by intermediating those time and bond-flavor mismatch risks.
Now, the story goes, that doesn’t happen: Dealers have shrunk their inventories and are less willing to do these sorts of trades with investors. Now, if you want to sell a bond, the dealer will moan and whine, and charge you a huge bid/ask spread, and only do the trade in small size, and only do it if he can immediately find a buyer for the exact same bonds, and take a week to get back to you, and so forth.
The other story is a story of risks: When bond prices go down, the story goes, everyone will have to sell, bond funds will liquidate in a vicious cycle, and dealers won’t be willing to take any risk to support the market. This is a somewhat untested theory, and also a somewhat weird one: Why would dealers buy tons of bonds when everyone else is selling? The dealer’s job is to intermediate bonds over time, not to stand on the opposite side of the whole market.
Bill Gross’s departure from Pacific Investment Management Co. was a good test case of, I think, the first story, but at scale. Bill Gross is certainly bond royalty, but it is not obvious that Bill Gross leaving one employer to go to another employer is a good reason for bond prices to crash. Like, at time zero, people own a bunch of bonds through the Bill-Gross-run Pimco Total Return Fund. At time one, people own roughly the same amount of bonds through some combination of the (1) non-Bill-Gross-run Pimco Total Return Fund, (2) non-Bill-Gross-run other Pimco funds, (3) Bill-Gross-run Janus Global Unconstrained Bond Fund and (4) whatever other bond funds they move to. Bill Gross’s departure may be a reason to get out of his old fund, but it is not obvious that it would be a reason to get out of bonds, permanently.
But in between time zero and time one, someone has to intermediate the flow of bonds out of the hands of the Total Return Fund and into the hands of whoever ends up holding them. That’s an intermediation in time — Total Return isn’t necessarily selling at the precise time that someone else is buying — and also in flavor, as you’d expect bonds that Bill Gross idiosyncratically favored to lose value during this migration to other, less idiosyncratic managers.
So who intermediates those flows? The obvious, and probably mostly correct, answer is “dealers.” But dealers are, so the story goes, expensive and annoying to deal with. They charge bid/ask spreads, they take time, and their balance sheets could be overwhelmed by the tens of billions of dollars that were leaving Gross’s old fund to go elsewhere. So there was some economic incentive for the end users to cut them out of the equation.
So they did! Or Pimco did. Or Pimco did a little. Pimco was a big bond seller, out of Total Return. It was also a buyer, in non-Bill-Gross-run funds to which investors were re-allocating money. For Total Return to dump bonds to dealers, paying bid/ask and pushing down prices, and for other Pimco funds to buy back those bonds, paying bid/ask again and pushing prices back up, would be a little nuts. So Pimco intermediated a portion of the trading in-house. How big a portion depends on how you count, but it’s not trivial. Total Return sold about $260 billion of bonds in the six months ended March 31, 2015, but it also bought about $224 billion, for net sales of $36 billion. It sold about $18 billion of those bonds to other Pimco funds, and bought about $4 billion from them. So something like 7 percent of Total Return’s gross selling, or 39 percent of its net selling, was to other Pimco funds.1