Why? Because it's worth it to B/Ds, and insurance companies that sell annuities to keep the "status quo."
No one can say what the final bill will contain after the Senate and House meet in committee to iron out differences between the two versions of financial reforms. It may be that the requirement for the fiduciary standard will win out.
But as investors hear about this 'study" and begin to understand the differences between the "suitability standard" and the "fiduciary standard" the choice will become clear, and fast. After all, who would you want to get your investment advice from–the one who puts your interests first, or the one who puts their own interests first?
Of course, we understand that not all brokers are out to do poorly by their customers. In fact, most brokers want to put customers first, even if their firms require them to put the firm's interests first. Until the financial-industrial complex decides to provide the legal structure and statutes and rewards for brokers to do so, this conflict will remain, brokers and insurers will not regain the public's trust and they will continue to see investors walk away. Caveat emptor to the buyers of B/D and insurers' stocks.
The Committee for the Fiduciary Standard performed–at the request of Sen. Tim Johnson, (D-South Dakota), the study's sponsor–an analysis of the questions in the study. The Committee's conclusion was clear: a study of whether brokers should put investors' interests first is not needed. The answers are well known and have been for more than a decade. This editor is a member of The Committee for the Fiduciary Standard.
Let's put the suitability standard versus fiduciary standard in concrete terms, as Tara Siegel Bernard did in her article, "Trusted Advisor or Stock Pusher? Finance Bill May Not Settle It," in The New York Times, on March 3, 2010. She wrote of one securities analyst who follows the financial industry for Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Guy Moszkowski. He projects that, if the fiduciary standard of conduct were extended to brokers who provide advice to investors, it "could cost a firm like Morgan Stanley Smith Barney as much as $300 million, or about 6 to 7 percent of this year's expected earnings." That's $300 million. A year. For one large firm.
To put it another way, if that firm had to act in the best interest of the clients it advises, under the fiduciary standard of conduct rather than the suitability standard that brokers operate under, it would earn less in fees and commissions. Why? Because it would not be able to sell products that have layers and layers of hidden fees. Because if it disclosed to investors in writing what the total cost of what is sold to them is, the investor would go elsewhere. But the flip side is, once the public learns of this, it will be crystal clear how much extra they pay for the privilege of being sold something that's in the broker's best interest.